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pain medication.1 University of Michigan student Thibault
DeSaintPhalle died from an overdose of cocaine and heroin at just eigh-
teen years old.2 At twenty-eight, aspiring model and actress Elisa
Bridges died from an overdose of heroin.3 These individuals are just
three of the hundreds of thousands of people who have died as a result of
drug abuse over the last decade.4 In 2009, drug overdoses outnumbered
traffic accidents as a leading cause of death, and the gap has only wid-
ened since.5
The national increase in drug-related deaths has largely resulted
from an increase in prescription drug abuse.6 In fact, forty-three percent
of all fatal drug overdoses in 2010 involved prescription painkillers.7
Despite national efforts to curtail prescription drug abuse, recent studies
show that prescription drug-related deaths have continued to rise in the
United States.8 According to Tom Frieden, the Director of the U.S. Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, prescription drug abuse is “a
big problem, and it’s getting worse.”9 Illicit drug abuse is also worsen-
ing in the United States. A 2012 survey reported that approximately
335,000 Americans were current users of heroin, up from the 153,000
reported in 2007, and that approximately 18.85 million Americans were
1. Obituaries, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/herald/
obituary-preview.aspx?n=ashley-brooks&pid=86449756&referrer=150.
2. John Counts, Autopsy: U-M Student Died from Accidental Heroin and Cocaine Overdose,
MLIVE (Dec. 26, 2013, 10:36 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/ann-arbor/index.ssf/2013/12/
autopsy_u-m_student_died_from.html.
3. Drug-Related Deaths—Notable Celebrities, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/
celebrity_deaths.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2014).
4. Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2009, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Dec.
29, 2011, at 50 (reporting 39,147 drug-induced deaths in 2009); Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths:
Final Data for 2010, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 2013, at 11 (reporting 40,393 drug-induced
deaths in 2010); see also Lisa Girion et al., Drug Deaths Now Outnumber Traffic Fatalities in
U.S., Data Show, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-drugs-
epidemic-20110918-m,0,1591295.story#axzz2qPsLh42N (“While most major causes of
preventable death are declining, drugs are an exception. The [drug-induced] death toll has doubled
in the last decade. . . .”).
5. Kochanek et al., supra note 4, at 49–50 (reporting 39,147 drug-induced deaths and 36,216
deaths from motor vehicle accidents in 2009, reflecting a difference of 2,931 deaths); Murphy et
al., supra note 4, at 39–40 (reporting 40,393 drug-induced deaths and 35,332 deaths from motor
vehicle accidents in 2010, reflecting a difference of 5,061 deaths); Scott Glover & Lisa Girion,
Prescription Drug-Related Deaths Continue to Rise in U.S., L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2013), http://
articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/29/local/la-me-ln-prescription-drugrelated-deaths-continue-to-rise-
20130329.
6. Glover & Girion, supra note 5 (stating that overdose deaths involving prescription
painkillers, including OxyContin and Vicodin, and anti-anxiety drugs, such as Valium and Xanax,
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current users of marijuana, up from the 14.4 million reported in 2007.10
Along with—and indeed, because of—the increase in drug abuse,
violent crime is on the rise across America.11 In October 2013, the U.S.
government reported a fifteen percent increase in violent crime from the
previous year.12 As drug addicts desperate for their next high frequently
resort to violent measures,13 the effect of drug abuse on the crime rate is
substantial.14 In fact, sixty percent of crime is drug or alcohol-related.15
Gang violence resulting from “turf battles” and the generally hierarchi-
cal infrastructure of illegal street sales is responsible for another twenty
percent of all crime.16 Because the civil forfeiture framework may be
invoked to deter gang violence in addition to drug crimes, civil forfeiture
is in a position to address eighty percent of all crime.17
Behind the increase in crime is the increase in drug abuse, and
behind the increase in drug abuse are the illegal drug sales that supply
drug addictions. Drugs that are illegally injected into our society
“‘threaten the health and welfare of youth and children, families and
10. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG
USE AND HEALTH tbl.1.1A (2007), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/SAMHDA/
studies/23782; SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL SURVEY ON
DRUG USE AND HEALTH tbl.1.12A (2012), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/
SAMHDA/studies/34933; see also News Release, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, National Survey Shows a Rise in Illicit Drug Use from 2008 to 2010 (Sept. 8,
2011), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/newsroom/press-announcements/201109081245.
11. Drugs and Crime, NAT’L COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM & DRUG DEPENDENCE, INC., http://
ncadd.org/index.php/learn-about-drugs/drugs-and-crime (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (“Drug
addiction can lead to criminal behavior. . . . Without question, drug use and criminality are closely
linked.”); Donna Leinwand Leger, Violent Crime Rises for Second Consecutive Year, USATODAY
(Oct. 24, 2013, 10:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/24/violent-
crime-rising-in-united-states/3180309/ (“The 2012 National Crime Victimization Survey by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics found . . . a 15% increase in how many people reported being victims
of rape, robbery or assault. Property crime—burglary, theft and car theft—rose 12% . . . . For
2011, data from the victims survey also showed an increase in violent crime: up 17% from 2010,
the sharpest rise in two decades.”).
12. Leger, supra note 11; see also Pete Yost, Crime on the Rise for a Second Year, BOSTON
GLOBE (Oct. 25, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/10/24/survey-
marks-year-crime-increases/at2pC9KAzFMmUP5oxq5y2M/story.html.
13. Social Effects of an Addiction—Drug Addiction, MEDIC8, http://www.medic8.com/drug-
addiction/social-effects.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (“Burglary, muggings, robberies . . . are
all ways of funding an addiction . . . [and] the more serious the addiction the greater the chance of
these being accompanied by violence. There are people who are so . . . completely controlled by
their addiction that they will do anything to service [it]. If this means using violence then they will
do so.”).
14. Leger, supra note 11.
15. Drugs and Crime, supra note 11 (stating that “60% of individuals arrested for most types R
of crimes test positive for illegal drugs at arrest”); see also Ed Gogek, Why Legalization Won’t
Work, REASONS TO OPPOSE ‘MEDICAL MARIJUANA’ IN ARIZONA, http://edgogek.com/brief-
summary/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
16. Gogek, supra note 15. R
17. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. § 874.08 (2013).
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communities,’” and the money generated by their illegal sale “‘feed[s]
corruption, enhance[s] the power of criminal networks[,] and create[s]
fear and  instability.’”18 According to the 2013 World Drug Report
issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, trafficking in
illegal drugs undermines the stability, security, and social and economic
development of entire regions.19 However, drug dealers and drug abus-
ers are, in many ways, equally culpable. In fact, “drug traffickers are
merely filling an insatiable demand for their products. It is the drug
users—addicts and casual users alike—who finance this national
destruction, and it is they, in addition to the drug traffickers, who must
ultimately bear the cost of their annihilative and illegal behavior.”20 By
penalizing both the sale and abuse of drugs, civil forfeiture mounts a
thorough response to the increase in crime.
Civil forfeiture was designed to address the various criminal mala-
dies that plague society by providing law enforcement an avenue to dis-
incentivize crime.21 By taking the economic profit out of crime, civil
forfeiture eliminates the incentive to engage in criminal activity.22 In
addition to deterring future crime, civil forfeiture penalizes criminals by
separating them from their profits23 and makes it difficult for criminals
to command the resources necessary to continue their illegal activities.24
In so doing, civil forfeiture tears away at the illegal narcotics market,
thereby attacking one of America’s greatest problems at its source.
Using the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act as an example, Part II
of this article will explain what civil forfeiture is and how it works. Part
III of this article will explain the policy objectives justifying civil forfei-
ture, and Part IV will explain critics’ concerns with civil forfeiture. Part
V of this article will continue to use the Florida Contraband Forfeiture
Act to demonstrate how statutory codifications of civil forfeiture have
upheld constitutional rights, despite critics’ claims to the contrary, and
will explain why criminal forfeiture is an insufficient alternative to civil
forfeiture. Part VI will challenge critics’ allegations that civil forfeiture
18. Susan Scutti, Drug Trafficking as Well as Drug Abuse Pose Health Threat to Many, UN
Report States, MED. DAILY (June 28, 2013, 5:32 PM), http://www.medicaldaily.com/drug-
trafficking-well-drug-abuse-pose-health-threat-many-un-report-states-247253.
19. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2013, available at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf.
20. Kelly McClure, Federal Civil Forfeiture of Assets: How It Works and Why It Must, 11 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 419, 420 (1991).
21.  Stefan D. Cassella, Forfeiture is Reasonable, and It Works, CRIM. L. & PROC. PRAC.




24. Asset Forfeiture, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
investigate/white_collar/asset-forfeiture (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
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is inherently corruptive, and Part VII will discuss the future of civil
forfeiture.
II. WHAT CIVIL FORFEITURE IS AND HOW IT WORKS
Do you remember when the class clown in your junior high school
English class had his pencil confiscated by the teacher because he
wouldn’t stop rapping on the table with it? Or how about when the most
popular girl in school had her cell phone confiscated by the principal
because she wouldn’t stop playing “Tracker” during an important
assembly in the auditorium? Civil forfeiture channels the nature of these
scenarios as it too is based upon the confiscation of assets. The activities
that are punishable by civil forfeiture are criminal, however, and the
assets sought to be confiscated are the proceeds and instrumentalities of
criminal activity. An instrumentality of crime is any real or personal
property that has facilitated the commission of a crime, and the proceeds
of crime are the profits, or “ill-gotten gains,” of that illegal activity.25
Although civil forfeiture is most commonly thought of as a response to
drug crimes, it may also be used as a response to certain white-collar
crimes.26
Civil forfeiture occurs at both the federal and state levels of govern-
ment.27 In fact, federal contraband forfeiture statutes formed the tem-
plate upon which many states based their own statutory constructions.28
Because the same policy objectives justify both federal and state civil
forfeiture schemes, the influence of federal contraband forfeiture statutes
upon their state counterparts comes as no surprise. Indeed, the federal
government has, like many state governments, taken the position that
civil forfeiture has the capacity to render criminal enterprises “powerless
to operate.”29 Criminal enterprises, like legitimate businesses, “generate
a profit from the sale of their ‘product’ or ‘services’” and “require
employees, equipment, and cash flow to operate.”30 By separating
criminals and criminal organizations from the equipment, cash flow, and
profits vital to their operation, civil forfeiture severs the lifeline to
25. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal—Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1335 (1991).
26. Brad Reid, An Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture and Recent Cases, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 14, 2013, 7:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brad-reid/civil-asset-forfeiture-ch_b_
3745209.html.
27. Joseph Cramer, Note, Civilizing Criminal Sanctions—A Practical Analysis of Civil Asset
Forfeiture Under the West Virginia Contraband Forfeiture Act, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 991, 995
(2010).
28. Id.
29. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 24.
30. Id.
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crime.31 For example, civil forfeiture may be employed to confiscate a
vehicle that has been used to transport and distribute illegal narcotics.
Similarly, money gained from illegal drug sales may also be confiscated.
By disrupting both the criminal’s incentive and ability to commit a
crime, his criminal enterprise is incapacitated, and his and others’ desire
to commit similar crimes is discouraged.
To provide a definition using formal terminology, civil forfeiture is
the process by which the government or a law enforcement agency may
gain title to an article of contraband seized pursuant to statutory authori-
zation.32 In Florida, the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act (referred to
hereinafter as “the Act”) enables law enforcement agencies to forfeit any
article of contraband that, in violation of the Act, is unlawfully trans-
ported, concealed, or possessed.33 Real or personal property acquired
with the proceeds of crime is similarly violative of the Act, as is the use
of any real or personal property “to facilitate the transportation, carriage,
conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter,
exchange, or giving away of any contraband article.”34 Under the Act,
the term “contraband article” includes, but is not limited to, controlled
substances and any real or personal property used or attempted to be
used in the commission of a felony, or acquired with proceeds gained by
a violation of the Act.35
In Florida, civil forfeiture is a bifurcated process to which two dis-
tinct evidentiary standards apply.36 The first stage of forfeiture, the
seizure stage, begins when an authorized agency takes possession of, or
“seizes,” property for which there is probable cause to believe in the
requisite, statutorily-defined connection to crime.37 The ultimate issue of
ownership is decided only later, in the second stage of civil forfeiture,
the forfeiture stage, to which a “clear and convincing” evidentiary stan-
dard applies.38 Law enforcement may seize personal property found to
be in violation of the Act at the time that the violation is discovered,
subject, of course, to the individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures and to the requirement that the
seizing agency notify all persons entitled to notice of the right to a post-
seizure adversarial preliminary hearing.39 Unlike personal property, real
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. § 932.702 (2013).
34. Id. § 932.702(3).
35. Id. § 932.701(2).
36. Id. § 932.703(2)(c), 932.704(8).
37. Id. § 932.703(2)(c).
38. Id. § 932.704(8).
39. Id. § 932.703(2)(a); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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property—including land and structures40—generally may not be seized
at the time of violation.41 Rather, individuals entitled to notice must first
be given the opportunity to attend a pre-seizure adversarial preliminary
hearing before real property is seized.42 Thus, any judge presiding over
an adversarial preliminary hearing must review the available evidence
and determine whether personal property has been properly seized or, in
the case of real property, whether the property should be seized at all.43
Presumably, the potentially farther-reaching consequences of taking
control of real, rather than personal, property necessitates the statutory
requirement that a finding of probable cause be made by a neutral judge
before real property is seized.
The purpose of an adversarial preliminary hearing is to determine
whether probable cause exists to believe that the subject property is in
violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.44 That is, the purpose
of an adversarial preliminary hearing is “to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe that the property was used, is being used, was
attempted to be used, or was intended to be used” to facilitate the trans-
portation, concealment, possession, or exchange of any contraband arti-
cle, or whether the property was acquired by proceeds obtained as a
result of such an act.45 Note that the standard of proof applied at adver-
sarial preliminary hearings, which deal only with the legality of the
seizure stage of forfeiture, is “probable cause.”46 Whether property is
ultimately forfeited is based on a “clear and convincing” standard of
proof.47
Persons entitled to notice of their right to attend an adversarial pre-
liminary hearing include any owner, lienholder, entity, or person in pos-
session of the property at the time of seizure.48 This notice must be
given to such individuals at the time the property is seized, or mailed no
more than five working days after the seizure.49 Should any such indi-
vidual request an adversarial preliminary hearing, such a hearing must
be held no more than ten days after the request is received or as soon as
practicable thereafter.50 Should they elect for and attend the hearing,
40. Real Property, LEGAL INFORMATION INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/real_property
(last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
41. § 932.703(2)(b).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 932.701(11)(f).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 932.703(2)(c).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 932.704(8).
48. Id. § 932.701(2)(e).
49. Id. § 932.703(2)(a).
50. Id.
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these individuals may present evidence to contest the existence of proba-
ble cause and, thus, the seizure of the subject property. At the adver-
sarial preliminary hearing—as well as at any other hearing on the
subject of forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act—the
seizing law enforcement agency carries the burden of proof.51 If the law
enforcement agency establishes that probable cause exists to believe that
the subject property is in violation of the Act, the court will thereafter
enter an order finding probable cause52 and will authorize either the ini-
tial or continued seizure of the property sought to be forfeited.53
If no person that is entitled to notice requests an adversarial prelim-
inary hearing, the court will determine whether a probable violation
exists by reviewing a complaint filed by the seizing agency.54 Unlike
criminal forfeiture, which is forfeiture achieved through criminal sen-
tencing,55 civil forfeiture is an action made directly against property.56
Consequently, the law enforcement agency must file an in rem action
against the seized property within forty-five days of seizure.57 If the
court determines from the complaint that probable cause exists to
believe that a violation of the Act has occurred, the court will enter an
order showing the probable cause finding.58
Once an order for probable cause has been entered and a copy
thereof, along with a copy of the complaint, served to each person with
an ownership or security interest in the property, any claimant who
wishes to contest the forfeiture has twenty days to file any responsive
pleadings.59 In addition to serving these documents to each person that a
“diligent search and inquiry”60 identifies as having an interest in the
property, the seizing agency must publish notice of the complaint in a
newspaper of general circulation once a week for two consecutive
weeks.61 If responsive pleadings are filed and the issue of forfeiture is
taken to trial, claimants are entitled to a jury trial, unless such right is
51. Id. § 932.701(11)(f).
52. Id. § 932.704(5)(b).
53. Id. § 932.703(2)(c).
54. Id. § 932.704(5)(b).
55. Stefan D. Cassella, The Case for Civil Forfeiture: Why In Rem Proceedings Are an
Essential Tool for Recovering the Proceeds of Crime, SELECTED WORKS OF STEFAN D. CASSELLA
(Jan. 2008), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=stefan_cassella.
56. Forfeiture, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/background/forfeiture/ (last
visited Sept. 7, 2014).
57. § 932.701(2)(c).
58. Id. § 932.704(5)(b).
59. Id. § 932.704(5)(c).
60. Id. § 932.704(6)(c).
61. Id. § 932.704(6)(a).
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waived.62 If the forfeiture goes to trial and the court or jury63 determines
that clear and convincing evidence exists to believe that the contraband
article was used or intended to be used in violation of the Florida Con-
traband Forfeiture Act, the court will enter an order forfeiting the prop-
erty to the seizing law enforcement agency.64
III. POLICY OBJECTIVES JUSTIFYING CIVIL FORFEITURE
Civil forfeiture is used by law enforcement agencies as a means of
undermining “the economic infrastructure of the criminal enterprise.”65
By separating the criminal from his profits, the financial incentive to
commit crime is eliminated.66 Because civil forfeiture is an in rem action
capable of achieving strong public policy objectives where circum-
stances have rendered in personam criminal forfeiture impossible or
unfavorable, federal officials have supported the fifty states in develop-
ing their own legislative framework codifying civil forfeiture. In 2007,
Stefan D. Cassella, the Deputy Chief for Legal Policy at the U.S.
Department of Justice, commented that “it is essential that the forfeiture
laws have a civil component that allows the State to recover the pro-
ceeds of crime whether there is a criminal prosecution of the wrongdoer
or not.”67 Also a proponent of civil forfeiture, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) has stated on its website that it aims to incorporate
civil forfeiture, “where appropriate and allowed by law, to deter criminal
activity and dismantle criminal enterprises.”68 The State of Florida has
invoked these interests statutorily, as indicated by the preface to the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, which states that it is the policy of
the State of Florida that the Act be used “to deter and prevent the contin-
ued use of contraband articles for criminal purposes while protecting the
proprietary interests of innocent owners . . . .”69 Indeed, civil forfeiture
is only appropriate so long as it is able to balance these interests.
In addition to preventing criminal activity, civil forfeiture allows
states to take the instrumentalities of crime out of circulation. Coupled
with its focus on the elimination of articles of contraband used or
intended to be used in the commission of drug crimes and various other,
nonspecifically expressed felonies, the Florida Contraband Forfeiture
62. Id. § 932.704(3).
63. Id. (stating that the ultimate issue of forfeiture shall be tried by a jury, unless the right to a
jury trial is waived).
64. Id. § 932.704(7).
65. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 24.
66. Cassella, supra note 21.
67. Cassella, supra note 55.
68. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 24.
69. § 932.704.
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Act has explicitly been dedicated by the legislature to the elimination of
contraband articles affiliated with gang activity. Pursuant to the Act, “all
profits, proceeds, and instrumentalities of criminal gang activity . . . and
all profits, proceeds, and instrumentalities of criminal gang recruitment
. . . are subject to seizure and forfeiture. . . .”70 In addition to its ability to
address gang violence, civil forfeiture has the power to shut down a
“crack house” from which drug dealers are selling drugs to children on
their way to school and thereby endangering the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the community.71 Similarly, “an airplane used to fly cocaine from
Peru into Southern California, or a printing press used to mint phony
$100 bills” may be confiscated through civil forfeiture.72 While such
visuals might incite enthusiasm for civil forfeiture, it is of paramount
importance that the desire to fight crime be offset by the right to secure
property ownership.73
IV. CRITICS’ CONCERNS WITH CIVIL FORFEITURE
Critics of civil forfeiture believe that the procedure functions to
replace criminal forfeiture as an easy and convenient means of “divest-
ing private citizens of property.”74 This belief is largely influenced by
the notion that “civil remedies offer speedy solutions that are unencum-
bered by the rigorous constitutional protections associated with criminal
trials, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, trial by jury, and
appointment of counsel.”75 Before explaining why these concerns are
unfounded, this article will identify and give due recognition to each.
A. Standard of Proof
Among critics’ greatest concerns with civil forfeiture is the differ-
ence between the standard of proof applicable to civil forfeiture proceed-
ings and that applicable to criminal proceedings.76 A “standard of proof”
dictates how compelling the evidence presented must be in order for the
70. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. § 874.08 (2013).
71. Cassella, supra note 21.
72. Id.
73. Reid, supra note 26.
74. Cramer, supra note 27, at 997; see also Forfeiture, supra note 56 (stating that civil R
forfeiture is a “threat to those concerned about abuse or circumvention of Constitutional
protections” and that “the source of [civil forfeiture’s] attractiveness to law enforcement” is its
independence from any criminal conviction).
75. Cheh, supra note 25, at 1329.
76. Williams, Holcomb & Kovandzic, Policing for Profit, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/
part-i-policing-for-profit-2 (last visited Sept. 7, 2014); McClure, supra note 20, at 438 (“As a
result of the differing burdens of proof in criminal and civil forfeiture cases, the government
stands in a better position to recover assets in the civil arena and will often opt not to prosecute
criminally nor separate the criminal prosecution from the forfeiture proceedings.”).
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prosecutor or petitioner—the former in a criminal proceeding and the
latter in a civil forfeiture case—to succeed on his or her claim.77 Gener-
ally, the standard of proof required to succeed on a civil forfeiture claim
is less than that “required to prove that the individual was guilty of the
criminal activity that supposedly justified the forfeiture in the first
place.”78 In other words, the standard of proof required in a civil trial is
less than that required in a criminal trial. The standard of proof required
in a criminal trial is “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which means that the
evidence must be so compelling that there is no reasonable doubt as to
the defendant’s guilt.79 “Beyond a reasonable doubt” is the highest stan-
dard of proof recognized by the American judicial system.80 The stan-
dard of proof in a civil trial requires less compelling evidence, either a
“preponderance of the evidence” or “an intermediate standard variously
expressed as proof by ‘clear and convincing,’ ‘clear, cogent, and con-
vincing,’ or ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence.”81 This, crit-
ics point out, can produce the paradoxical result of a criminal
defendant’s property being forfeited via civil forfeiture, despite an
acquittal of the defendant in a criminal court on charges arising from the
same facts as those that produced the forfeiture. Because of the lesser
evidentiary standard applied in civil forfeiture proceedings, critics feel
that civil forfeiture allows law enforcement to circumvent the protec-
tions accorded defendants in criminal courts and to succeed on claims
they would not otherwise succeed on were the higher, criminal eviden-
tiary standard applied.
B. Civil Forfeiture as an Action In Rem
Critics have also undermined civil forfeiture by pointing out that
the procedure is based on the antiquated judicial theories supporting and
defining actions in rem.82 More specifically, critics argue that “[b]y pro-
ceeding directly against the property itself rather than a property owner,
in rem civil forfeiture allows the government to avoid many of the con-
stitutional protections that a criminal defendant would ordinarily be enti-
77. Williams, Holcomb & Kovandzic, supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. Criminal Cases, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Understandingthe
FederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/CriminalCases.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
80. TERENCE ANDERSON ET AL., ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 243 (2d ed. 2005).
81. Id.
82. LEONARD LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 20 (1996) (“The
personification fiction infects the law of civil forfeiture to this day, as does the notion that the
inanimate thing caused a misfortune or even a crime, for which it must be punished by forfeiture
to the government. The government has superseded the king.”); see also Forfeiture, supra note 56
(“By acting civilly, the government seeks to remedy a harm, through the fiction of the property’s
‘guilt.’”).
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tled to receive.”83 Opponents of civil forfeiture dedicate a great deal of
their literature to reminding readers of the historic—and often laugh-
able—legal fictions that originally justified in rem proceedings. Histori-
cally, these critics remind us, ships suspected of criminal activity were
treated as if they were “living, breathing defendant[s] accused of crime”
and were “arrested and prosecuted by name.”84 When the property was
‘convicted,’ the government would sell “the offending property” at an
auction and deliver the proceeds to the king and governor.85 According
to critics, these historic in rem proceedings were riddled with “reduced
protection of innocent owners, potential hardship to family and descend-
ants, reduced due process protection, and lessened focus on owner cul-
pability.”86 Critics believe that “modern civil forfeiture . . . shares many
of the drawbacks of ancient forfeiture,” because it, like “ancient forfei-
ture,” is an in rem proceeding.87
C. Criminal Procedure Guarantees
Aside from the difference in standards of proof, there are other
guarantees accorded to criminal defendants that are not constitutionally
required in civil proceedings. Consequently, critics argue that civil for-
feiture is an avenue through which law enforcement agencies may avoid
the “strict due process requirements” that apply to criminal prosecu-
tions.88 While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitle criminal defend-
ants to state-supplied counsel and a jury trial, there are no constitutional
provisions that entitle parties to civil actions to the same protections.89
Although opponents of civil forfeiture have dedicated much of their
attention to the alleged “circumvention” of these specific guarantees,
they often criticize civil forfeiture for depriving citizens of procedural
due process generally, arguing that civil forfeiture allows law enforce-
ment to take property “without a semblance of fair procedure.”90 A more
specific concern about civil forfeiture as it relates to procedural due pro-
cess is the allegation that it allows law enforcement officials to seize
83. Cramer, supra note 27, at 996.
84. Id. at 994.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 995.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 992.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. V; The Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel, NAT’L PARALEGAL C., http://nationalparalegal.edu/conlawcrimproc_public/RightsAt
Trial/RightToCounsel.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
90. LEVY, supra note 82, at 20; see also Nkechi Taifa, Civil Forfeiture v. Civil Liberties, 39
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 95, 95 (1994) (“[Civil forfeiture violates the constitutional] right not to be
deprived of property without due process of law.”); see generally Douglas Kim, Asset Forfeiture:
Giving Up Your Constitutional Rights, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 527 (1997).
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property without fair notice or an opportunity to be heard.91
D. Improper Incentives for Law Enforcement
Opponents of civil forfeiture also argue that the civil forfeiture
framework is inherently corruptive. Specifically, they believe that by
allowing a seizing law enforcement agency to gain title to property that
it itself seizes,92 civil forfeiture injects an “improper monetary incen-
tive” that encourages “‘for profit policing.”93 They further claim that
there are essentially no “real limitations” as to how law enforcement
agencies may spend money earned by civil forfeiture.94 Critics argue
that because of a lack of limitations on spending, the majority of law
enforcement revenue is now improperly dependent upon how often and
how aggressively law enforcement agencies pursue private citizens’
property.95
V. ADDRESSING CRITICS’ CONCERNS USING CIVIL FORFEITURE AS
CODIFIED BY THE FLORIDA CONTRABAND FORFEITURE ACT
A. Defending the Difference in Standards of Proof
Critics often misalign the probable cause standard applicable to the
seizure stage of civil forfeiture with the “proof beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard applicable to criminal trials.96 Instead, critics should
compare the standard of proof applied in criminal trials to that applied in
civil forfeiture trials. In other words, critics should compare the eviden-
tiary standard applicable to criminal trials to the evidentiary standard
applied at the forfeiture stage of civil forfeiture—at which the ultimate
issue of ownership is decided—rather than to the often lesser standard
applied to the seizure stage of civil forfeiture. This would be a more
equitable approach because, although a law enforcement agency must
promptly submit to a court for a probable cause determination for the
purpose of mitigating the potential for long-term and ultimately
improper seizures, states’ civil forfeiture schemes generally apply higher
91.  Roger Pilon, Forfeiting Reason, CRIM. L. & PROC. PRAC. GROUP NEWSL. (Federalist
Soc’y, Wash., D.C.), May 1, 1997, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/
forfeiting-reason ([O]fficials can seize a person’s property, real or chattel, without notice or
hearing. . . .”).
92. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. § 932.703(1)(a) (2013).
93. Cramer, supra note 27, at 992.
94. Id. at 1015.
95. Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway
Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
96. Taifa, supra note 90, at 98 (“Authorities must simply satisfy a requirement of probable
cause that the property was used in an illicit activity or was purchased with funds from illicit
activity in order to subject the property to forfeiture.”).
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standards of proof to determine the ultimate issue of forfeiture.97 For
example, although probable cause is required to effectuate a seizure of
property alleged to be in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture
Act,98 the standard of proof required to prove the forfeitability of prop-
erty at trial is “clear and convincing.”99 The misalignment of standards
of proof is especially unwarranted considering that, in a bifurcated,
criminal proceeding where liability and sentencing are considered sepa-
rately, the government may only need to prove the forfeitability of prop-
erty by “a preponderance of the evidence,” which is less than the
standard of proof required in civil forfeiture proceedings in Florida and
fifteen other states and at least equal to the standard of proof required in
civil forfeiture proceedings in another twenty-four states.100 Thus, the
reverse of critics’ concern with the difference in standards of proof
could actually be true—the government could meet the applicable evi-
dentiary standard establishing a right to criminal forfeiture, but not meet
the applicable evidentiary standard establishing a right to civil forfeiture.
Traditionally, criminals may face two potential trials.101 That is, a
criminal may be made defendant to both a criminal prosecution initiated
by the government, as well as to a civil suit initiated by the criminal’s
victim(s).102 While the purpose of a criminal trial is to adjudicate guilt
and impose a proper punishment, civil actions are generally pursued by
victims for the purpose of obtaining compensation.103 These traditional
purposes aptly demonstrate the complementary relationship and appro-
priate distinction between “criminal sanctions” and “civil remedies.”104
Property rights are not absolute and generally do not warrant the
added protection of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” evidentiary stan-
dard. As where an individual’s property may be subject to forfeiture
based on the same allegations of which that individual was acquitted in
criminal court, a civil plaintiff may be awarded compensation at the
expense of a defendant who has been acquitted of the crime that suppos-
edly justified the plaintiff’s recovery in the first instance.105 Despite this
97. Williams, Holcomb & Kovandzic, supra note 76.
98. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2) (2013).
99. Id. § 932.704(8).
100. Williams, Holcomb & Kovandzic, supra note 76.
101. Cheh, supra note 25, at 1327.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also LEVY, supra note 82, at 22 (“The distinction between civil and criminal
forfeitures reflects the distinction between civil and criminal law. Civil law determines private
rights, and it provides remedies and compensation for harm done to those rights. Criminal law
punishes criminal offenders.”).
105. Compare People v. Simpson, No. BA 097211, 1995 WL 569648 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A.
County Sept. 21, 1995), with Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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apparent paradox, the difference in the standards of proof applied in civil
and criminal trials is justified by the consequences that face the defen-
dant should the prosecution or plaintiff prevail.106 Indeed, “many judi-
cial dicta suggest that the degree of probability [of guilt or liability] may
depend on the seriousness of the consequences to the subject of the alle-
gation . . . .”107 This trend suggests that society is more willing to accept
the possibility of a false payment of damages than the possibility of false
incarceration, which entails a physical deprivation of liberty. Criminal
trials require a higher standard of proof than civil trials because criminal
defendants face a deprivation of liberty if convicted, whereas civil
defendants face the lesser evil of an order to pay monetary damages if
the plaintiff prevails.108 Because claimants to property in a civil forfei-
ture proceeding are facing a deprivation of neither life nor liberty, the
heightened standard of proof necessary to protect criminal defendants is
not warranted. Just as the civil defendant faces the less severe conse-
quence of an order to pay money, so too the claimant to property in a
civil forfeiture proceeding faces the less severe consequence of an order
to forfeit property of monetary value.
However, the fact that there is one, identifiable victim hoping to be
“made whole” in most civil proceedings may contribute to society’s
greater acceptance of false payment than false imprisonment. Yet, the
fact that claimants to property in a civil forfeiture proceeding do not
generally have any one, particular victim to answer to does not mean
that their offenses have not produced victims. For example, drug traf-
ficking—the most common offense for which property is forfeited109—
victimizes both individuals and entire communities. This is because the
illegal injection of drugs into a community affects the health and safety
of the community’s population.110 Consequently, the remedies offered to
plaintiffs in civil cases at a lesser burden of proof are equally—if not
more—deserved by the communities that suffer from the crimes at the
center of civil forfeiture cases. Indeed, even civil forfeiture’s worst crit-
ics have conceded that civil forfeiture “[provides] financial restitution to
the community.”111 Civil forfeiture allows law enforcement agencies to
collect civil remedies on behalf of their communities. By collecting on
106. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 80, at 243 (“‘[I]n proportion as the crime is enormous, so
ought the proof to be clear.’”).
107. Id.
108. Scott E. Sundby & Barbara D. Underwood, Burden of Proof, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME &
JUST. (2002), http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Burden_of_proof.aspx.
109. Radley Balko, Take the Money and Run: The Crazy Perversities of Civil Asset Forfeiture,
SLATE (Feb. 4, 2010, 5:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2010/02/take_the_money_and_run.html.
110. Scutti, supra note 18.
111. Cramer, supra note 27, at 995.
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crimes that, like drug trafficking, have a wide span of victims who are
not specifically identifiable and are not otherwise actionable by the com-
munity’s general population for want of standing, law enforcement
agencies are able to use earnings from civil forfeiture in ways that bene-
fit the true victim: the community. Moreover, where specific victims
have proven identifiable, civil forfeiture has been said to allow for these
victims’ compensation more adequately than restitution statutes.112
While the objective in a criminal forfeiture is to punish,113 the
objective in a civil forfeiture is to deter the commission of similar crimes
by both the defendant and others and to use criminals’ profits against
them by making law enforcement agencies better and communities safer.
Indeed, the desire for punishment is so deeply embedded in the context
of criminal sentencing that property forfeited criminally need not even
be related to the crime.114 Because civil forfeiture is based on using
criminals’ “ill-gotten gains” to benefit the community, civil forfeiture is
more appropriately aligned with civil remedies than criminal sanctions,
and, thus, with the lesser standard of proof applied to the pursuit of civil
remedies.
B. How the In Rem Nature of Civil Forfeiture Serves Functions for
Which Criminal Forfeiture is Insufficient
Although critics balk at the antiquated theories upon which civil
forfeiture has developed, it is the in rem nature of civil forfeiture that
allows the procedure to function and to achieve the public policy goals,
which justify it in the first instance. Unlike an action in personam, an
action in rem is directed toward property, rather than toward a person.115
As previously mentioned, in rem proceedings were historically justified
by the legal fiction that the property had done something wrong.116 Over
time, however, this otherwise antiquated justification has been “merged
with a belief that the right to own property could be denied an individual
who engaged in criminal conduct,” as well as with a need to resolve
multiple claims to property in a single proceeding.117 As such, the sup-
port for an action in rem goes beyond any archaic theory. Specifically,
the in rem character of civil forfeiture promotes judicial efficiency. That
112. Cassella, supra note 21.
113. Heather J. Garretson, Federal Criminal Forfeiture: A Royal Pain in the Assets, 18 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 45, 47 (2008).
114. Id. at 52 (“If tracing the directly forfeitable asset is impossible, the government may seek
forfeiture of other property as a substitute asset.”); see also LEVY, supra note 82, at 22 (conceding
that, in criminal forfeiture, “[t]he property need not have a relationship to the crime”).
115. Actions in Rem: Proceedings Against Property, JUSTIA US LAW, http://law.justia.com/
constitution/us/amendment-14/41-actions-in-rem.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).
116. Cassella, supra note 55.
117. Asset Forfeiture, supra note 24.
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is, in contrast to an in personam action—which requires that defendants
be individually located, served, and tried—civil forfeiture provides
notice to all claimants with an interest in seized property at once, thus
minimizing the burden on courts.118
Contrary to critics’ accusations that the independence of civil for-
feiture from any criminal conviction is for the purpose of “[circum-
venting] Constitutional protections,”119 it is by virtue of its separation
from any criminal prosecution that civil forfeiture often becomes the
only viable option through which criminal proceeds may be separated
from even the most clearly guilty defendants. That is, as an in rem action
separate from criminal prosecution, civil forfeiture provides law
enforcement the opportunity to pursue legitimate interests in situations
where criminal forfeiture—forfeiture achieved through criminal sentenc-
ing—is or becomes unavailable, despite the existence of evidence suffi-
cient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.120 Such situations arise
where a criminal conviction (the necessary prerequisite to criminal for-
feiture) is either not possible or not pursued for reasons other than the
demanding burden of proof. For example, a criminal conviction is not
possible where the criminal defendant has died, has fled, or is unknown.
Although a criminal conviction is possible absent such circumstances, a
criminal conviction may not be appropriate in situations where the inter-
ests of justice are more effectively served by the civil forfeiture of prop-
erty than by the criminal conviction of the malfeasant, which must
always precede a criminal forfeiture.121 The justification for law
enforcement’s forfeiture of criminal proceeds remains strong in such
instances, notwithstanding the unavailability or impropriety of criminal
forfeiture. That is especially true in cases where the alleged crime is of
such a nature as to be more effectively addressed by civil forfeiture than
by the imprisonment of the wrongdoer, such as where a young adult has
used his or her computer to create counterfeit currency.122
There are several situations for which criminal forfeiture is insuffi-
cient. For example, in a criminal forfeiture, only property in which the
defendant has an interest may be forfeited, regardless of whether or not
the owner of the property knew their property was being used in the
118. Cassella, supra note 55 (arguing that “[w]e could bring a separate . . . action against each
party with an interest in the property, but that would be cumbersome. . . . Civil forfeiture is the
better approach: we bring an action against the property . . . give everyone notice and an
opportunity to litigate a claim, provide a defense for innocent owners and resolve all third party
issues at one time . . . .”).
119. Forfeiture, supra note 56.
120. Cassella, supra note 55.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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commission of a crime.123 This would mean that the same individual
could repeatedly and without consequence lend their vehicle to known
drug dealers for the purpose of transporting illegal narcotics. Thus, hav-
ing a civil counterpart to criminal forfeiture is necessary for the forfei-
ture of criminal proceeds that may have been seized from a criminal
defendant, but which are owned by third parties who are aware of or
involved in the commission of the underlying crime.124 Under the Flor-
ida Contraband Forfeiture Act, the government has the burden of dem-
onstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the third party owner
“either knew, or should have known after a reasonable inquiry, that the
property was being employed or was likely to be employed in criminal
activity.”125 Unless the government proves that the owner was more
likely than not aware of the manner in which their property was being
used, the owner’s interest in the property is protected by what has been
coined the “innocent owner” defense to forfeiture.
Demonstrating the austerity of this evidentiary burden, the court in
In re Forfeiture of 1984 Chevrolet S-10 Pickup Truck held that a woman
neither knew, nor should have known, that her husband would use her
vehicle to conduct an illegal drug transaction, despite her admitted
awareness of his having a history of drug addiction and evidence that
she had removed him from their joint bank account and from the title on
her motor vehicle as a result of his addiction.126 Coming to the opposite
conclusion, the court in Gross v. City of Wilton Manors allowed the
forfeiture of a third-party owner’s vehicle, but only after the owner
openly testified to having had reason to believe that her son was using
the car in furtherance of illegal activities.127
Civil forfeiture is also necessarily distinct from a criminal convic-
tion in situations where the criminal defendant has died, has fled, or is
unknown and therefore incapable of incurring criminal liability.128
Where the defendant is unknown, criminal proceeds may be discovered
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. § 932.703(6)(a) (2013).
126. In re Forfeiture of 1984 Chevrolet S-10 Pickup Truck, 515 So. 2d 274, 275–76 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) (“[A]s a result of [her husband’s] drug addiction, [wife] had changed all of their
bank accounts and the title to the car she drove from their joint names to her name alone, because
she did not want to chance their dissipation in the event [her husband] was unsuccessful in
effecting a cure of his drug dependency. She did nothing toward restricting his use of the truck
during the rehabilitation period, nor did she make any independent inquiry as to his progress in
that regard.”).
127. Gross v. City of Wilton Manors, 487 So. 2d 303, 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (Owner of
confiscated vehicle admitted knowledge of her son’s drug problem before giving him “‘total use’
of the car for two months prior to [his using the car in the furtherance of a burglary].”).
128. Cassella, supra note 55.
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in the hands of a mere courier not otherwise connected to the crime.129
In such a case, law enforcement’s interest in confiscating property that is
between crimes remains strong, though their interest in pursuing crimi-
nal charges against the courier may be minimal or nonexistent. This is
especially true in the context of organized crime, wherein “organi[z]ed
crime heads use their resources to keep themselves distant from the
crime which they are controlling and to mask the criminal origin of their
assets,” thereby preventing their prosecution and keeping their profits
out of the reach of criminal forfeiture.130 Although putting kingpins in
jail is beyond its reach, civil forfeiture does put pressure on criminal
organizations by cutting them off from the resources essential to their
regime. In the similar situation where a criminal defendant becomes a
fugitive and thereby insusceptible to either conviction or criminal forfei-
ture, civil forfeiture allows for forfeiture of the fugitive’s criminal
gains.131 The fugitive maintains his right to contest such a forfeiture, but
may only do so if he surrenders to law enforcement.132
Criminal forfeiture is also incapable of reaching the illegal profits
of a criminal defendant who has died.133 Because civil forfeiture is not
precluded by the death of a criminal defendant, civil forfeiture maintains
both its deterrent effect and the possibility of restitution beyond the
criminal defendant’s lifetime. For example, Kenneth Lay, the former
Chief Executive Officer of Enron, died after he had been convicted of
six counts of conspiracy and fraud, but before a criminal forfeiture order
could be imposed to recover the more than $95 million that he made
from “‘trading Enron stock, manipulating his Enron line of credit and
receiving an incentive bonus’ as the company was spiraling into insol-
vency.”134 Civil forfeiture became the only way that the proceeds of
Lay’s criminal activity could be recovered.135 Although the action
against these proceeds is still pending, a judgment in the government’s
favor will yield funds for the Enron Victim Trust, which was established
for the 20,000 Enron employees and countless investors that lost their
life savings after the 2001 scandal.136
129. Id.
130. Anthony Kennedy, Justifying the Civil Recovery of Criminal Proceeds, 12 J. FIN. CRIME
8, 12 (2004).
131. Cassella, supra note 55 (“[The fugitive] cannot ignore the process of the court in the
criminal case and ask the court to protect his property interests in the civil one.”).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Richard Rubin, Kenneth Lay, Deceased Enron CEO, Triumphs Over IRS in Tax Court,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 30, 2011, 12:50 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-29/
enron-ceo-kenneth-lay-bests-irs-in-tax-court.html.
135. Cassella, supra note 55.
136. ENRON VICTIM TRUST, http://www.enronvictimtrust.com/ (last updated Sept. 11, 2013).
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Criminal forfeiture is also insufficient to the extent that it is limited
to those crimes for which a state’s legislature has statutorily authorized
punishment by criminal forfeiture,137 whereas a civil forfeiture action
may be brought against property used in the commission of “any fel-
ony.”138 Of course, state legislatures could extend criminal forfeiture
schemes to cover the same crimes as civil forfeiture, but such would
serve only to supplant civil forfeiture with a procedure still incapable of
addressing the scenarios described in the foregoing comparison.
Additionally, criminal forfeiture is insufficient to the extent that the
policy rationales justifying civil forfeiture are not served by criminal
forfeiture. By nature and unlike civil forfeiture, criminal forfeiture is a
prosecution tool the proceeds of which the state does not necessarily
appropriate to the assistance of law enforcement. Consequently, crimi-
nally forfeited property would not necessarily be used to better law
enforcement the way that civilly forfeited property is.139 By making the
state responsible for forfeitures, convictions by plea bargain could pre-
sent the unusual circumstance of criminal defendants turning over their
property in an effort to lessen their sentence, which could be interpreted
as effectively paying off the state to achieve a lesser sentence. The sig-
nificance of that scenario is that the state’s judgment in sending
criminals to jail might be impaired by the attraction of assets offered up
in plea agreements by wealthy criminal defendants. In other words, crit-
ics would have to worry about prosecuting for profit, rather than polic-
ing for profit.140 Rather than being put in jail, criminals could remain on
the streets. Furthermore, criminal forfeiture provides only for the forfei-
ture of property related to the offenses for which a criminal defendant is
being tried and convicted, but not for property related to criminal
offenses to which the defendant may admit, but for which he or she was
not otherwise charged or arrested. Such property may be limited in com-
parison to the entirety of proceeds from a drug empire, for example. In
contrast, civil forfeiture, by focusing on the property rather than on the
criminal, provides for the forfeiture of proceeds of crimes for which
there is evidence to prove, though no conviction for the commission
thereof.
Despite the inadequacies of criminal forfeiture relative to civil for-
feiture, one consequence of the in rem nature of civil forfeiture that con-
cerns critics is the independence of civil forfeiture from criminal
137. Criminal Forfeiture, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-
007-003.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2014) (stating that criminal forfeiture may not be ordered
except as a response to those crimes “for which forfeiture is to be imposed”).
138. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(a)(5) (2013).
139. Id. § 932.7055(5)(a).
140. Williams, Holcomb & Kovandzic, supra note 76.
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conviction. Critics’ concern with this independence lies with the possi-
bility that a person may have his or her property civilly forfeited but be
exonerated of the alleged criminal activity that justified the forfeiture.141
In such a scenario, the purported purpose of civil forfeiture of taking
criminal’s profits and resources would fail on its face, as the person
from whom property will have been forfeited would not then be a crimi-
nal. Civil forfeiture proceedings function to prevent law enforcement
authorities from being able to use the procedure as a means of taking
property away from those who they otherwise lack the evidence to have
convicted. In fact, the nature of civil forfeiture proceedings ensures that
where the applicable evidentiary standard establishes a right to the for-
feiture of a claimant’s property, society can generally rely on the claim-
ant being convicted in his or her counterpart criminal case. That is, by
requiring a connection between property sought to be civilly forfeited
and criminal activity, civil forfeiture schemes inherently give rise to
courts delving into the matter of criminal liability, though the process is
removed from any formal conviction. Because there can be no connec-
tion between property and that which does not exist, civil forfeiture by
nature requires the underlying crime to have actually been committed
and to have been committed by the claimant.142
In Florida, “[i]t is an affirmative defense to a forfeiture proceeding
that the nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the com-
mission of any underlying violation was incidental or entirely acciden-
tal.”143 By operation of this provision, the reverse of critics’ concerns
could actually occur—a criminal defendant could be adjudicated guilty
and yet his property not be civilly forfeited because the property was
deemed to have had only an incidental connection to the criminal activ-
ity. By virtue of having to determine whether there is a connection
between seized property and criminal activity, the criminal nature of the
alleged activity is reviewed by the court, if only inadvertently. Support-
ing this proposition is the fact that Florida courts have extended the
exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings to prevent the review of
inculpatory evidence that is unlawfully obtained.144 There would be no
reason to extend the exclusionary rule if criminal liability were not being
considered through the review of inculpatory evidence.
141. Id.
142. JUDITH SECHER & JAMES SWAIN, FLORIDA FORFEITURE HANDBOOK 365 (2d ed. 2005)
(explaining the innocent owner defense to forfeiture).
143. § 932.703(8).
144. Alvarez v. City of Hialeah, 900 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (“[W]here the
claimants raised a Fourth Amendment challenge to the stop of the vehicle, that issue must be
addressed first and independently of the question of whether there is a nexus between the seized
currency and unlawful drug activity.”).
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Also assuaging critics’ concern with the independence of civil for-
feiture from criminal conviction is the fact that proof establishing a
criminal defendant’s innocence in criminal court remains available to
the defendant in a counterpart civil forfeiture proceeding. Furthermore,
if the indirect review of criminal liability is insufficient to address the
scenario concerning critics, the possibility of its occurrence is slim. In an
informal survey of those civil forfeiture actions initiated by the Martin
County Sheriff’s Office over a period of eighteen months and resulting
in the forfeiture of property, there was also a conviction for the crime
alleged.145
C. How the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act Preserves the
Procedural Due Process Rights Accorded in
Criminal Proceedings
1. RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
Although the right to a fair trial is guaranteed by the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, “the Constitution
‘defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several
provisions of the Sixth Amendment.’”146 Opponents of civil forfeiture
argue that claimants in civil forfeiture proceedings are not provided the
same assurances to procedural due process as criminal defendants
because, unlike criminal proceedings, civil proceedings are not governed
by the Fifth and Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel and by the Sixth
Amendment’s right to trial by jury.147 Civil forfeiture statutes have
largely been attacked as violative of due process to the extent that the
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment do not explicitly apply, despite the
fact that the Fifth Amendment implicitly applies procedural due process
requirements to civil and criminal proceedings alike.148 Although civil
proceedings are not governed by a separate, constitutional amendment
specifically outlining the minimum procedural requirements necessary
to satisfy due process the way that criminal proceedings are, the due
process standard established by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
are no less stringent in civil forfeiture proceedings than in criminal pro-
ceedings.149 Indeed, the standard is the same. Because the due process
standard to be met in a criminal proceeding is the same as that to be met
in a civil proceeding, state civil forfeiture statutes include procedural
145. Informal survey on file with the author.
146. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984).
147. Jay A. Rosenberg, Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
390, 401 (1988); U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
149. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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rules that bind civil forfeiture proceedings just as the Sixth Amendment
binds criminal proceedings.150 In fact, many states have interpreted pro-
cedural due process rights to require the right to a jury trial in a civil
forfeiture proceeding.151 Taking the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act
as an example, the Florida Supreme Court held in In re Forfeiture of
1978 Chevrolet Van that a claimant of seized property is entitled to a
jury trial in any forfeiture proceeding held pursuant to the Florida Con-
traband Forfeiture Act.152 In 1992, the Florida legislature codified this
ruling by providing for the right to a jury trial in the Act itself.153
2. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Although the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel applies only to
criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to
extend the right to counsel to civil cases where necessary.154 However,
the Supreme Court has only found the extension of the right to counsel
necessary in cases where a “physical deprivation of liberty is
threatened.”155 In fact, it has also created a presumption against the right
to counsel in cases lacking such a threat.156 Based on the Court’s posi-
tion, the rationale that justifies a higher standard of proof in criminal
cases than in civil cases appears to be the same rationale that justifies the
appointment of counsel in criminal cases and not in civil cases. That is,
protections such as a right to counsel and a high standard of proof are
necessary in criminal proceedings because most criminal defendants
face a physical deprivation of liberty: incarceration.157 In contrast, civil
defendants and claimants to property in a civil forfeiture proceeding are
not punishable by incarceration. Absent the severe consequences facing
criminal defendants, extension of the right to counsel to the civil setting
is not warranted. To require otherwise would be to burden the state with
the requirement of providing counsel to an alleged criminal for both his
criminal trial and civil forfeiture proceeding.158
Although the circumstances justifying the appointment of counsel
150. Reid, supra note 26.
151. DEE EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 112 (2004) (“[T]he right to a jury trial varies among the states. Several states specifically
grant a statutory right to a jury trial . . . and a few hold that the right to a jury trial is granted under
the state constitution.”)
152. In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van VIN: CGD1584167858, 493 So. 2d 433 (Fla.
1986).
153. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(3) (2013); 1992 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 92-54 (C.S.H.B. 397)
(West).
154. Rosenberg, supra note 147, at 401.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 402.
157. Sundby & Underwood, supra note 108.
158. Rosenberg, supra note 147, at 405.
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in criminal cases do not exist in civil forfeiture cases, the Florida legisla-
ture nonetheless provides claimants prevailing in civil forfeiture cases
with financial compensation for attorney’s fees.159 That is, if the court at
an adversarial preliminary hearing determines that no probable cause
exists to believe that a claimant’s property was used in violation of the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, the statute provides that the claimant
is entitled to “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”160
3. FAIR NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
Governmental takings of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law are prohibited by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution.161 There is both a substantive and procedural
component to due process.162 Procedural due process generally “refers to
the procedural limitations placed on the manner in which a law is admin-
istered, applied, or enforced. Thus, procedural due process prohibits the
government from arbitrarily depriving individuals of legally protected
interests without first giving them notice and the opportunity to be
heard.”163 Indeed, courts have consistently interpreted procedural due
process as requiring “an appropriate legal procedure including prior
notice and a right to be heard by a neutral decision maker.”164 In other
words, procedural due process requires that fair notice, a neutral judge,
and a hearing be accorded any individual facing a deprivation of their
life, liberty, or property.165
As claimants in civil forfeiture cases face a possible deprivation of
their property, the requirements satisfying an individual’s right to proce-
dural due process are necessarily invoked. In order to satisfy this consti-
tutional requirement, “[c]ivil asset forfeiture statutes contain procedural
rules . . . .”166 In the case of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, for
example, there are procedural rules that ensure that claimants to property
receive the adequate notice and opportunity required by due process.
Fair notice requires that individuals be given the “opportunity to
159. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. § 932.704(9)(b) (2013).
160. Id.
161. Reid, supra note 26.




164. Reid, supra note 26; see, e.g., United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970).
165. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (“‘The fundamental requisite of due process of
law is the opportunity to be heard.’ . . . [Due process] principles require that a recipient have
timely and adequate notice. . . . [A]n impartial decision maker is essential [to due process].”).
166. Reid, supra note 26.
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know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly . . . .”167
Although fair notice is constitutionally required for the benefit and pro-
tection of the individual, fair notice is incidentally also in the best inter-
est of the government.168 Without fair warning as to what the law is and
what conduct it deems legal and illegal, compliance with the law would
not be effectuated.169 The deterrence of prosecution would have no
effect on individuals’ behavior if individuals were not aware of what
they could be prosecuted for in the first instance.170 Fair notice is partic-
ularly important in the context of civil forfeiture, which is justified by a
need for deterrence of crime. Although common law suggests that the
property of even an innocent owner should be forfeited where that
owner has negligently entrusted their property to the wrong person,171
the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act is mindful of the tenet that deter-
rence from crime is not effectuated if those whose property is subject to
forfeiture are not involved in the underlying crimes. Evidencing a com-
mitment to effective deterrence, the Act protects third-party owners who
do not have a reason to know that their property is being used in the
commission of a crime through the innocent owner defense to
forfeiture.172
In most instances, the constitutional requirement of “fair notice”
may be satisfied simply by virtue of the law having been put into
effect.173 The threshold issue is that “[f]airness requires that an actor
have at least an opportunity to find out what the criminal law prohibits.
Actual notice is not required for liability; it is enough that the prohibi-
tion has been lawfully enacted.”174 This is so even though it is unlikely
“that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he
murders or steals . . . .”175
By virtue of its lawful enactment and detailed provisions of rights,
the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act ensures individuals’ right to fair
167. Campbell v. Bennett, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (quoting Landgraf v.
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)).
168. Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 335, 363–64 (2005) (identifying the following societal interests in providing fair notice:
“increasing compliance, such as through deterrent effect; reserving criminalization decisions to
the legislature; increasing uniformity in the treatment of similar cases; and reducing the potential
for the abuse of discretion”).
169. Id. at 363.
170. Id. at 347 (“Men . . . cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment.”).
171. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 466 (1996) (“[All] historical antecedents [were based]
on the notion that the owner ha[d] been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that
he [could be] properly punished for that negligence.”).
172. SECHER & SWAIN, supra note 142, at 365.
173. Robinson, supra note 168, at 364.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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notice. In addition to outlining the claimant’s rights and opportunities at
each of the several stages of a forfeiture proceeding, several provisions
of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act even detail claimants’ possible
defenses. In addition to the innocent owner defense, the Act outlines an
“accidental or incidental nexus” defense theory.176 By detailing not only
what constitutes a violation of the Act, but also what theories may
defend an allegation thereof, the Act provides fair notice beyond the
constitutional minimum. Because fair notice is sufficient where a warn-
ing has been provided in comprehensible language as to “what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed,” the Florida Contraband Forfei-
ture Act and other lawfully enacted civil forfeiture statutes have per se
met this constitutional requirement.177
The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act also provides law enforce-
ment agencies with instructions to ensure that claimants are given an
opportunity to be heard. At the onset of the forfeiture process—the
moment at which the property is seized by law enforcement—any per-
son determined “after a diligent search and inquiry”178 by the seizing
agency to be entitled to notice has the statutory right to receive such
notice at either the time of seizure or via certified mail sent no more than
five working days after the seizure.179 In addition to being prompt, the
notice provided must explain to the recipient that he or she has the right
to an adversarial preliminary hearing, which is the first of claimants’
opportunities to be heard and to contest the seizure if they so desire.180
As with the initial provision of notice, a law enforcement agency is
again responsible for acting nearly immediately should an individual
elect to contest the seizure at such a hearing. More specifically, the seiz-
ing agency must arrange and give notice for an adversarial preliminary
hearing to be held no more than ten days after the claimant’s request is
received or as soon as thereafter practicable.181 Whether or not a claim-
ant elects to attend an adversarial preliminary hearing, the adversarial
preliminary hearing is not the end of claimants’ opportunities to be
heard. Even where claimants do not prevail at the adversarial prelimi-
nary hearing, they continue to be entitled to a jury trial at which they
may again contest the forfeiture of their property.
176. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. § 932.703(8) (2013) (“It is an affirmative
defense to a forfeiture proceeding that the nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and
the commission of any underlying violation was incidental or entirely accidental.”).
177. Robinson, supra note 168, at 364.
178. § 932.701(2)(e).
179. Id. § 932.703(2)(a).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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D. Why Civil Forfeiture Does Not Offend Notions of Liberty Despite
Its Perceived Economic Benefit
As previously explicated, critics argue that “[t]he ability to confis-
cate property . . . creates a perverse incentive for the police to seize
property, [because] they get to keep it.”182 This allegation is incongruent
with the statutory protections that thwart the possibility of an economic
incentive, however. In some ways, the argument is also undercut by the
lack of literature criticizing the use of civil forfeiture in the context of
white collar crimes—from which law enforcement agencies generally
stand to gain sums of money equal to, if not greater than, those they
stand to gain from drug crimes—suggesting that critics can be unwar-
rantedly more sympathetic to the generally less wealthy, though no less
culpable, drug dealer. Nevertheless, the possibility of an improper eco-
nomic incentive in the context of either type of crime is tempered by the
fact that law enforcement officers are officials acting on behalf of the
government, not “self-interested private parties.”183 While it is uncon-
tested that law enforcement officers may not directly pocket seized
money, or drive home from the scene of a seizure in a claimant’s vehi-
cle, critics nonetheless seem to rely on the theory of a trickle-down
effect to prove a perverse economic incentive. That is, critics seem to
believe that although funds gained from civil forfeiture are initially
deposited into a general fund, funds ultimately end up in the hands of
officers in the form of higher salaries. However, the Florida Contraband
Forfeiture Act explicitly provides that neither the proceeds of nor the
interest from civil forfeiture gains may ever “be used to meet normal
operating expenses of the law enforcement agency,” including and espe-
cially officers’ salaries.184 Funds remaining after the payment of costs
incurred in connection with the forfeiture of property are only to be used
for “law enforcement purposes,” limited to “crime prevention, safe
neighborhood, drug abuse education and prevention programs” and to
the defrayment of such costs as those incurred by “complex investiga-
tions” and by the provision of “additional equipment or expertise.”185
One advisory opinion by the former Attorney General of Florida sug-
gested that the standard for use of the funds is a strict one, as it opined
that funds could not properly be used to construct a building for the
storage of evidence because such an activity was neither expressly pro-
182. Fred E. Foldvary, Civil Asset Forfeiture, PROGRESS REPORT (Jan. 9, 2007), http://www.
progress.org/tpr/civil-asset-forfeiture-2/.
183. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 663 (1974) (distinguishing
between “self-interested private parties” and “government officials” in response to plaintiff’s
allegations of for-profit policing).
184. § 932.7055(5)(b).
185. Id. § 932.7055(5)(a).
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vided for in the statute nor an activity that was beyond the normal opera-
tions of the agency.186
If the seizing agency wishes to use money from the fund, the sheriff
or chief of police must make a written request to the board of county
commissioners or to the governing body of the municipality certifying
its compliance with these requirements.187 Moreover, law enforcement
agencies that acquire $15,000 or more pursuant to the Florida Contra-
band Forfeiture Act “must expend or donate no less than 15 percent of
such proceeds for the support or operation of any drug treatment, drug
abuse education, drug prevention, crime prevention, safe neighborhood,
or school resource officer program(s).”188 Though there are no statutory
safeguards to prevent the Florida Legislature from decreasing funds
appropriated to such programs in reliance of forfeiture funds, as has
been an issue in the case of funds appropriated to schools by lotteries,
for example,189 the Florida Legislature has acknowledged the threat of
supplantation by agencies and the entities having control over them by
statutorily prohibiting the anticipation of “future forfeitures or proceeds
therefrom in the adoption and approval of the [agency’s] budget. . . .”190
Such statutory language reveals a concession by the legislature that there
is no reasonable or reliable way to project the amount of funds that will
be donated from forfeiture revenue in any given year. Proceeds from
civil forfeiture depend on the number of offenses made in violation of
the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, the number of which cannot be
reasonably predicted. Projecting the funds to be donated would also be
difficult considering the variance in circumstances between agencies
across the state. This lack of certainty in calculation should prevent the
Florida Legislature from relying on such funds and keep the required
fifteen percent donation as surplusage.
Because none of the permissible expenditures end with money in
officers’ hands, it seems that critics have at times unwarrantedly inter-
twined corruption with the lawful practice of civil forfeiture. Contrary to
critics’ allegations, however, funds earned by civil forfeiture are to be
used for the betterment of law enforcement agencies so that they may, in
turn, make communities and neighborhoods safer. Because each of the
186. Expenditure of Funds Generated by Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act by Board of
County Commissioners to Construct a Permanent Building to be Used for Storing Evidence in
Criminal Cases, Unauthorized, 1986 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 110 (1986).
187. § 932.7055(5)(b).
188. Id. § 932.7055(5)(c).
189. Oliver Libaw, Where Does Lottery Revenue Go?, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/US/
story?id=92598 (last visited Aug. 30, 2014) (“The lottery money does go to the intended cause.
However, instead of adding to the funds for those programs, legislators factor in the lottery
revenue and allocate less government money to the program budgets. . . .”).
190. § 932.7055(9).
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enumerated, allowable expenditures is for the good of the public, the
overarching incentive to officers is the desire to contribute to the public
welfare.
Akin to their combining corruption with lawful civil forfeiture, crit-
ics have argued that “[a]sset forfeiture practices often go hand-in-hand
with racial profiling and disproportionately impact low-income African-
American or Hispanic people who the police decide look suspicious
. . . .”191 Although these arguments fail to separate the lawful use of civil
forfeiture from the discriminatory use of racial profiling—a practice
which neither the law, nor law enforcement supports—civil forfeiture
legislation in Florida has been proactive about addressing these con-
cerns.192 For example, the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act requires
law enforcement officers to undergo special training classes emphasiz-
ing racial and ethnic sensitivity before they are able to seize property for
the purpose of a civil forfeiture.193 Also preventing civil forfeiture from
disproportionately impacting minorities is the fact that, with or without
an adversarial preliminary hearing, a neutral judge reviews every civil
forfeiture action to ensure the existence of probable cause before forfei-
ture can proceed. Law enforcement officers’ awareness of this judicial
review serves to deter questionable seizures arising from unlawful or
pretextual detentions.194
In terms of racial profiling, the real evil is not the lawful practice of
civil forfeiture, but rather the separate and distinct problem of corrupt
law enforcement. Racial profiling is a serious societal harm that must be
addressed, but it is not caused or influenced by the civil forfeiture frame-
work. Even in the context of pretextual traffic stops, prejudice is at the
root of racial profiling, not the ability to conduct a traffic stop itself.
Discrimination by law enforcement personnel is a serious problem that
is offensive to the lawful pursuit of civil forfeiture, and states with their
own civil forfeiture framework would agree with that. Indeed, Florida
courts have not shied away from castigating agencies exhibiting discrim-
191. Civil Asset Forfeiture, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-
reform/civil-asset-forfeiture (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
192. § 932.706 (“The curriculum for the course of training and continuing education [in civil
forfeiture pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act] must include . . . racial and ethnic
sensitivity . . . .”).
193. Id. § 932.706.
194. Jack E. Call, Virginia Police Legal Bulletin, RADFORD UNIVERSITY, http://www.radford.
edu/content/va-chiefs/home/october-2008/probably-cause.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2014) (“The
reason why courts review probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations of the police in
the first place is to make law enforcement officers aware that these determinations will often be
examined later in a court of law. Awareness of this fact should have the desirable effect of making
those officers more careful when deciding whether to stop, arrest, frisk, or search.”).
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inatory tendencies.195
VI. UNTANGLING CIVIL FORFEITURE FROM
 CRITICS’ ACCUSATIONS OF IMPROPRIETY
A. Why Critics Have Misplaced the Blame for Their Concerns
Rather than any functional defect, perhaps it has been the high rate
of default judgments in civil forfeiture proceedings that has
unnecessarily caught the attention of critics. Similarly, the reputation of
civil forfeiture may have been unjustifiably damaged by the multitude of
false and informal literature pervading the Internet, from which the gen-
eral population gathers much of its information.196 For example, one
website expressing opposition to civil forfeiture erroneously states that
law enforcement agencies pursue civil forfeiture whenever they feel they
have come upon “a civil rather than a criminal case,” thereby insinuating
that law enforcement agencies pursue civil forfeiture when they do not
feel they have enough evidence to make a criminal case.197 The same
website also maintains that civil forfeiture is “increasingly . . . used for
. . . even legal activities” and that “[s]ometimes, just having the property
. . . is sufficient to have it seized.”198 Even more formal literature, as that
from the Institute of Justice, for example, has accused law enforcement
personnel of “[preferring] civil forfeiture because it affords property
owners fewer protections than criminal proceedings, thus making it eas-
ier to seize assets. . . .”199 Scholarly literature has also been found mak-
ing the erroneous statement that civil forfeiture allows law enforcement
officials to seize property from innocent owners “without notice or hear-
ing. . . .”200 As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, however, claim-
ants of property sought to be civilly forfeited are accorded the same if
not greater protections than that provided to those whose property is
sought to be criminally forfeited.
Assuming, arguendo, that critics’ concerns with civil forfeiture are
reasonable and that innocent owners’ property is, in fact, being forfeited,
critics have wholly neglected to address the failure of claimants to assert
defenses. Eighty percent of forfeiture cases in the United States are
195. Taifa, supra note 90, at 105 (“The [Florida] court found that not only were the claimant’s
constitutional rights to property, privacy, equal protection, due process and freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure violated, but it also found ‘a lack of good faith and an abuse of
the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office’s discretion under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.’”).
196. See generally Foldvary, supra note 182.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Williams, Holcomb & Kovandzic, supra note 76.
200. Pilon, supra note 91.
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uncontested.201 One scholar reported that in August 2013 they found that
in the forty federal and state decisions concerning civil forfeiture made
in the previous month, the government prevailed by default in “a signifi-
cant number” of them because—aside from the government’s meeting
the applicable evidentiary standard—no claimant challenged the forfei-
ture.202 A complete failure to take advantage of the guarantees accorded
cannot be overcome by an increase in notice or in the number of oppor-
tunities to be heard. If property were being taken from innocent owners,
as critics argue, it may be fair to say that more forfeiture actions would
be contested. Of course, critics would counter that the expense of hiring
an attorney prevents claimants’ responses, but that too is unconvincing
when one considers that the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act provides
compensation for a claimant’s attorney’s fees should they prevail at the
adversarial preliminary hearing and even for lost wages should they pre-
vail at trial.203 In many cases, claimants who know they have committed
the alleged offense may opt for a default judgment as an alternative to
hiring an attorney because they know their case will be adjudicated
according to their guilt.204
B. How the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act Mitigates and
Recompenses Losses Incurred by Ultimately Prevailing
Claimants: Balancing Deterrence and the
Innocent Owner’s Property Rights
As with criminal proceedings, civil forfeiture proceedings have the
potential to substantially inconvenience accused individuals who ulti-
mately prevail on their defense. Seizures of property are not foolproof,
and civil forfeiture does not purport to be. Absolute justice does not
exist—all we have is human decision-making. Persons charged with a
crime are not always found guilty, and property seized for civil forfei-
ture is not always going to be found as having been used in violation of
the governing statute. Indeed, it is in recognition of these very possibili-
ties that the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to be heard and a
neutral judge to listen. It goes without saying that the false arrest of an
innocent person and the false seizure of honestly-earned property are
discomfiting possibilities of our legal system, but insusceptibility to
201. Cassella, supra note 55.
202. Reid, supra note 26.
203. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. § 932.704(9)(b) (2013).
204. Mark Johnson, Legal Definition of a Default Judgment, LEGALSOURCE (Mar. 19, 2010),
http://www.legalsource360.com/index.php/legal-definition-of-a-default-judgment-2645/ (“A
default judgment may not always be a bad thing for the defendant. . . . [I]f someone is being sued
and has no defense—they know they will lose, and fully expect to pay . . . they may choose this
route to avoid hiring an attorney.”).
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error cannot exist when human fallacy innately affects our judges, juries,
and law enforcement officers. Instead, we must rely on rules to mitigate
and compensate for the inconveniences suffered by those individuals
whose defenses prove legitimate.
Cognizant of the unfortunate possibility of a false seizure, many
states’ civil forfeiture statutes—the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act
among them—include provisions to mitigate the losses incurred by
claimants to falsely seized property. Because of the risk of interfering
with an ultimately innocent owner’s property, state legislatures often
subject the use of civil forfeiture to the strong property rights of the
innocent owner by providing for a manner of compensation where those
rights have been encroached upon. For example, by attempting to mini-
mize the length of time a claimant’s property is held while a finding of
probable cause is pending, the short statutory deadlines mandated by the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act account for the possibility that prop-
erty may be determined by the court to have been seized absent a proba-
ble violation and ensure that claimants receive their property back
promptly if such turns out to be the case. Further, the Florida Contra-
band Forfeiture Act mandates that notice of the opportunity for a hearing
be sent within five working days after the seizure of the subject property
and that adversarial preliminary hearings be held within ten days of a
claimant’s request for one or as soon as practicable thereafter.205 In addi-
tion to ensuring prompt resolution via short statutory deadlines, there are
several other guidelines by which seizing agencies must abide so as to
mitigate or compensate for losses that may be incurred by a claimant
whose property is ultimately found to have been held absent the required
probable cause. For example, at no time prior to gaining title may a law
enforcement agency use seized property for any purpose.206 In addition,
the agency must make “[r]easonable efforts . . . to maintain seized prop-
erty in such a manner as to minimize loss of value.”207 Moreover, that
probable cause must first be established before any trial on the subject of
forfeiture may be held shows the importance of law enforcement agen-
cies being able to immediately demonstrate a legitimate cause for their
continued seizure of property.
Seizing agencies must even pay a claimant’s reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs if no probable cause is found to exist at the adversarial
preliminary hearing.208 If the claimant prevails at the conclusion of the
forfeiture proceeding, whether at trial or on appeal, the seizing agency is
205. § 932.703(2)(a).
206. Id. § 932.703(1)(d).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 932.704(9)(b).
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responsible for indemnifying the claimant for the reasonable loss of
value of the seized property and for any loss of income attributable to
seizure of the property.209 (Loss of income may occur, for example,
when an individual’s motor vehicle or other source of transportation to
work has been seized.) Furthermore, the seizing agency may not charge
a prevailing claimant for any fees or costs associated with the seizure or
forfeiture proceeding.210
VII. WHAT’S NEXT?
As drug abuse and drug trafficking worsens in the United States,
criminals involved in the drug trade “must shoulder the blame for the
desperately unwanted phenomena of the desecration of individual lives,
erosion of the quality of life in America, and threats to national secur-
ity.”211 Because approximately sixty percent of crime is related to drug
or alcohol abuse, however, states’ legalization of drugs like marijuana
make both violent crimes and drug crimes more likely.212 That is,
because the use of marijuana is associated with an increased likelihood
of prescription drug abuse,213 trafficking in illegal substances is poised
to increase as a result of marijuana’s legalization. As a result, civil for-
feiture will become an increasingly relevant deterrent to counteract lib-
eral legislations that may otherwise incentivize criminal activity.
Going forward, civil forfeiture will continue to face a bandwagon
of critics that misstate and misperceive the legitimate objectives of civil
forfeiture. Just as these critics built their oppositional movement one
piece of writing at a time, so too will proponents of civil forfeiture have
to promote the redirection of thoughts on civil forfeiture one response at
a time, starting, of course, with this one.
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210. Id.
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